Because of the study's small number of subjects (394) and the use of a
convenience sample, I was expecting to see the paper conclude with the
usual "these preliminary findings call for further research using
larger and more representative samples." Instead, I found three
pages of broad conclusions, including "The US administration may need
to face this reality and realize that launching channels such as Sawa
and Alhurra must go hand-in-hand with changing and/or modifying its
policies on the ground."
The most controversial finding, that the Arab students' attitudes
towards U.S. foreign policy had worsened since they started listening
to Radio Sawa and watching Alhurra, cannot convincingly be made based
on one correlational analysis involving this small, non-representative
group of subjects. Nevertheless, it precipitated the U.S. News headline
("The more you hear, the less you like"). Other media outlets can be
expected to provide similar coverage.
This study is illustrative of the perception by most scholars and
decision makers in the United States that exposure to international
broadcasts can and should change attitudes. But people generally tune
to foreign broadcasts in to get news that is more comprehensive and
more credible than the news they get domestically. Through their
exposure to international broadcasts, audiences are,
for better or worse, more completely and accurately informed. During a
period including the Iraq War and its complicated aftermath, as well as
continued strife in and around Israel, it is to be expected that Arab
views towards U.S. policy might deteriorate. A reasonable goal for U.S.
international broadcasting is to ensure that any such deterioration of
attitudes is not exacerbated by misinformation and disinformation, from
other sources, about U.S. policies and actions.
In the el-Nawawy paper, I am badly misquoted by a secondary source as
saying: "Arab people will always look at Alhurra as a propaganda
station that publicized the ideas of the US government." I don't
remember saying that, and I certainly never thought that. I have always
stressed that U.S. international broadcasting must retain its autonomy.
About Alhurra, it may never match Aljazeera or Alarabiya in audience
size, but it can serve a significant role in reaching Arabs who would
like to receive news from a U.S. source and to know more about American
life and institutions. This is being accomplished to some extent, given
Alhurra's fairly respectable daily audience figures, ranging from two
percent to fifteen percent of households in various Arab countries (27
percent in Iraq, where it has terrestrial transmitters).
Kim's comments about the el-Nawawy study
Because of the study's small number of subjects (394) and the use of a convenience sample, I was expecting to see the paper conclude with the usual "these preliminary findings call for further research using larger and more representative samples." Instead, I found three pages of broad conclusions, including "The US administration may need to face this reality and realize that launching channels such as Sawa and Alhurra must go hand-in-hand with changing and/or modifying its policies on the ground."
The most controversial finding, that the Arab students' attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy had worsened since they started listening to Radio Sawa and watching Alhurra, cannot convincingly be made based on one correlational analysis involving this small, non-representative group of subjects. Nevertheless, it precipitated the U.S. News headline ("The more you hear, the less you like"). Other media outlets can be expected to provide similar coverage.
This study is illustrative of the perception by most scholars and decision makers in the United States that exposure to international broadcasts can and should change attitudes. But people generally tune to foreign broadcasts in to get news that is more comprehensive and more credible than the news they get domestically. Through their exposure to international broadcasts, audiences are, for better or worse, more completely and accurately informed. During a period including the Iraq War and its complicated aftermath, as well as continued strife in and around Israel, it is to be expected that Arab views towards U.S. policy might deteriorate. A reasonable goal for U.S. international broadcasting is to ensure that any such deterioration of attitudes is not exacerbated by misinformation and disinformation, from other sources, about U.S. policies and actions.
In the el-Nawawy paper, I am badly misquoted by a secondary source as saying: "Arab people will always look at Alhurra as a propaganda station that publicized the ideas of the US government." I don't remember saying that, and I certainly never thought that. I have always stressed that U.S. international broadcasting must retain its autonomy. About Alhurra, it may never match Aljazeera or Alarabiya in audience size, but it can serve a significant role in reaching Arabs who would like to receive news from a U.S. source and to know more about American life and institutions. This is being accomplished to some extent, given Alhurra's fairly respectable daily audience figures, ranging from two percent to fifteen percent of households in various Arab countries (27 percent in Iraq, where it has terrestrial transmitters).
Kim