"'Strategic' information operations prosecuted overseas and targeted against terrorist propaganda have not been allowed to develop and mature because they were perceived as bureaucratic threats to the traditional public affairs function of our government. Ironically, efforts to get strategic information operations off the ground were countered by aggressive public affairs campaigns against them inside our own government. If we are serious about actually winning the war on terror, we must implement and sustain widespread and effective information operations and public diplomacy programs at both the local and strategic level. This effort has very little in common with dealing with the various press corps and is simply not the work for press secretaries and traditional public affairs people." Daniel Gallington, Washington Times, 2 March 2008.
     A central point is trying to escape from this vaguely worded op-ed. The writer seems to be suggesting that President Bush's "public affairs team" is preventing the Pentagon from carrying out its information operations. Really? The writer also regrets that the Pentagon was not able to keep its Office of Strategic Information.
     Maybe, however, the White House public affairs team has a point. It could be problematic to have the Defense Department, the State Department, and maybe some future replacement for USIA, all speaking for U.S. policies as each would like those policies to be. This could result in a "war of words" entirely within the U.S. government.
     Just sketching a few notes on the back of my napkin: 1) Broad U.S. foreign policy should be determined by the White House and NSC. 2) Those policies should be advocated and explained globally by the State Department public diplomacy office. This might be done by a reconstituted USIA, but the effort would be basically the same, save for the addition of a new layer of senior bureaucracy. 3) The Defense Department should support its operations and promote U.S. policies to enemy military personnel and local civilians, but only in areas of U.S. military activity. 4) U.S. international broadcasting should cater to the audience's need for credible news. As such, USIB would not be guided by policy. It would, however, report on those policies, thus helping foreign publics understand U.S. policies. 5) There may also be covert "black" communications efforts that claim to be one thing, but really are something else. The less we know about them, the better. Keep in mind that people are not so easily fooled.